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Abstract
The European Union has not deÞned its limits in geographical terms. Each enlarge-
ment has led and will lead to a decrease of the European Unions per capita GDP. After
the collapse of the Soviet Union, the transition countries went through a long and deep
recession. However, they have reached a stage of positive growth and their tax levels are
approaching the lower limit of the range of tax/GDP ratios in European Union countries.
Diﬀerences exist in tax capacity and tax eﬀort. In some countries, greater eﬀorts are
possible to improve tax revenues. Further examination of the timing of tax administra-
tion reform may shed light on tax eﬀort in transition countries. The paper also suggests
the existence of a negative relationship between tax eﬀort and corruption. (JEL P27,
H20); Atlantic Econ. J., 32(2): pp. 75-88, June 04. c°All Rights Reserved
Introduction
It is quite common to talk about Europe, the European Union, Western Europe, Central
and Eastern Europe, and South-Eastern Europe. However, it is not quite clear what most of
these terms mean. The exception is the European Union, which is not a geographical notion
but a well-deÞned political concept resulting from its membership of 25 countries (as of May
1, 2004). The other termsEurope, Western Europe, Central and Eastern Europe, and
South-Eastern Europeare geographic rather than political in character and are less clear
than they seem at Þrst sight. For example, Israeli and Turkish football clubs participate in
European soccer competitions. The Eurovision Song Festival also includes participants from
Israel and Turkey. This suggests that Israel and Turkey are European countries. However, it
seems likely that many people would not consider these countries part of Europe. Yet, Turkey
is a candidate-member country of the European Union even though most of its territory is
located in Asia [van der Hoek, 2003a, p. 44].
The European Union has not deÞned its limits in geographical terms. The Treaty on
European Union says in Article 49 that any European State which respects the principles
set out in Article 6(1) may apply to become a member of the Union. Article 6(1) states
that the Union is founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights
and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law, principles which are common to the Member
States. The European Union has granted Bulgaria, Romania, and Turkey the status of
candidate-member countries. Bulgaria and Romania are expected to join the European Union
in 2007, whereas Turkey hopes to receive a preliminary entry year by the end of 2004. If so,
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this will most likely be a year in the mid 2010s. Moreover, the European Union has identiÞed
the countries of the West Balkans region, including former Yugoslav republics, as potential
candidates.
The Copenhagen European Council has made the principles set out in Article 6(1) of the
Treaty on European Union more concrete. These so-called Copenhagen criteria comprise a
political criterion, an economic criterion, and the ability to take on the acquis communautaire:
1) Stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and
respect for and protection of minorities;
2) The existence of a functioning market economy, as well as the ability to cope with
competitive pressures and market forces within the EU;
3) The ability to take on the obligations of membership, including adherence to the aims
of political, economic, and monetary union.
Enlarging the European Union
Following the deÞnition used by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Develop-
ment (EBRD), this paper refers to regions in Europe that comprise the following countries:
Central and Eastern Europe: Croatia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, and Slove-
nia; South-Eastern Europe: Albania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Macedonia, and Romania; Baltic
States: Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania; and Newly Independent States: the 12 former Soviet
Republics excluding the Baltic States.
Table 1 shows some basic characteristics of the ten accession countries in Central and
Eastern Europe in the mid 1990s, that is, at the time of their applications for European Union
membership. Their combined population amounted to 28 percent of that of the European
Union of 15 member states. However, their combined GDP amounted to only 4 percent of
that of the EU-15 at current prices, or 9 percent at purchasing power standards. GDP per
capita in the applicant countries amounted to 13 percent at current prices or 32 percent at
purchasing power standards. Thus, the applicant countries are poor relative to European
Union member states. Though their population is sizeable, their economic weight is very
small.
TABLE 1
CEE-10 in % of the EU, 1995
Area Population Total GDP GDP per capita Total GDP GDP per capita
(current prices) (current prices) (purchasing (purchasing power)
power)
33 28 4 13 9 32
Source: European Commission, 1997, p. 68.
Figure 1 shows GDP levels in the individual accession countries in Central and Eastern
Europe and South-Eastern Europe relative to the European Union average, both in 1995
and 2002. It includes the level of the poorest European Union member state (Greece) as a
benchmark. Obviously, Slovenia is the richest of the accession countries, while Romania is
the poorest. However, relative positions changed considerably during the period 1995-2002.
Former Soviet republics, the Baltic States, which started the reforms at relatively low GDP
levels, showed the strongest growth. In 1995, Latvia was the poorest applicant country with
a per capita GDP of 18 percent of the European Union average in 1995, followed by Estonia
and Romania with a per capita GDP of 23 percent. In 2002, however, Estonias GDP per
capita had almost doubled to 42 percent of the European Union average, whereas Romanias
per capita GDP had barely risen to 25 percent.
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FIGURE 1
GDP Per Capita in Purchasing Power Standards as % of EU-average, 1995 and 2002
Source: European Commission [1997, p. 68; 2003, p. 42]
The European Economic Community, one of the European Unions predecessors, was
founded in 1957 by six countries: France, Germany, Italy, and the Benelux countries (Belgium,
the Netherlands, and Luxembourg). Several enlargements occurred since 1957. Table 2
compares the 2004 enlargement with previous enlargements:
1) The 1973 enlargement when Denmark, Ireland, and the United Kingdom joined the
European Union and European membership increased to nine countries;
2) The southern enlargement in the 1980s (Greece in 1981 and Portugal and Spain in
1986) increased the European Union membership to twelve member states;
3) The 1995 enlargement increased the membership to Þfteen countries when Austria,
Finland, and Sweden joined the European Union.
TABLE 2
Impact of Successive Enlargements of the European Union (based on 1995 data)
Increase Increase in Increase in Change in per Average per
in area population total GDP capita GDP capita GDP
(EU-6=100)
EU-9/EU-6 31% 32% 29% -3% 97
EU-12/EU-9 48% 22% 15% -6% 91
EU-15/EU-12 43% 11% 8% -3% 89
EU-26/EU-15 34% 29% 9% -16% 75
Source: European Commission, 1997, p. 24.
Table 2 ignores the enlargement of 1990 when the former German Democratic Republic
(East Germany) joined the European Union as a result of the reuniÞcation with the Federal
Republic of Germany (Western Germany). Though Cyprus is also included in Table 2, it
does not make a diﬀerence compared to the ten accession countries in Central and Eastern
Europe given Cyprus small size.
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On May 1, 2004, the fourth major enlargement occurred when ten countries joined the
European Union all at once: the three Baltic States (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania), Þve
countries in Central and Eastern Europe (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia,
and Slovenia), and two Mediterranean mini-states (Cyprus and Malta). In terms of area and
population, this enlargement is comparable to that of 1973. However, it is unprecedented
in terms of the number of accession countries, their diversity, and their level of economic
development relative to that of the European Union. Although each enlargement has led to
a decrease of the European Unions per capita GDP, the 2004 enlargement will result in the
biggest decrease ever. Both in 1973 and 1995, total GDP increased somewhat less than the
European Unions population leading to a decrease of GDP per capita by 3 percent. However,
the southern enlargement of the 1980s involved countries that were substantially poorer than
the European Union countries. Therefore, the increase of the European Unions total GDP
was much smaller than the population increase. As a result of the southern enlargement, the
European Unions GDP per capita fell by 6 percent to 91 percent of that of the original six
member states. In magniÞed form, the same thing occurred after the eastern enlargement of
2004. GDP per capita in the European Union decreased by 16 percent to a low of 75 percent
of that of the original six member countries.
Post-communist Europe
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, Europe changed considerably in a short span of time.
The end of the Cold War era was deÞnite by the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the collapse
of the Soviet Union in 1991. These changes took place with breathtaking speed [van der
Hoek, 1998]. The government of the Federal Republic of Germany honored East Germanys
president Erich Honecker on an oﬃcial visit in 1987, whereas only a couple of years later
the same government Þled a suit against Erich Honecker and arrested him. Freed from the
ideological monopoly of communism and Soviet domination, Central and Eastern European
countries turned their minds and societies towards the West. Given the uncertain future,
the prospect of stability, security, and prosperity under the umbrella of the European Union
was highly attractive to them. The countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the Newly
Independent States began their journey from centrally planned to market economies and
embarked on reforms including macroeconomic stabilization policies, expenditure reforms,
and tax reforms.
The European Union encouraged this approach because it wanted to secure economic and
political stability in its own backyard. It stimulated the process of European uniÞcation, in
particular, by concluding Europe Agreements that formed the legal basis for bilateral relations
between the European Union and associated countries [Schoors and Gobbin, 2004]. As early
as December 1991only a few months after the collapse of the Soviet Unionthe European
Union signed the Þrst Europe Agreements with Poland and Hungary. These agreements
oﬀered trade concessions and other beneÞts normally associated with full membership of the
European Union. The aim of the agreements was to establish a free-trade area between the
European Union and the associated countries and, ultimately, to enlarge the Union toward
the East. In the next phase, Europe Agreements were also concluded with Bulgaria, the
Czech Republic, Romania, and Slovakia (1993); Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania (1995) and
Slovenia (1996). Croatia Þled an application in 2003, while other countries in the West
Balkans will undoubtedly follow.
Initially, the transition triggered a long and deep recession. As a result, GDP decreased
sharply as Figure 2 shows. The transition recession has been longest and deepest in the
Newly Independent States and South-Eastern Europe. In the mid 1990s, Central and Eastern
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Europe and the Baltic States, as well as South-Eastern Europe, turned to positive GDP
growth. In Central and Eastern Europe and the Baltic States, a period of continued growth
followed. However, South-Eastern Europe was unable to sustain this growth and suﬀered a
backlash in the late 1990s. At the turn of the century, however, South-Eastern Europe shows
positive growth again. The transition recession in the Newly Independent States lasted
throughout the 1990s. However, they reached a period of positive growth rates from 1999.
FIGURE 2
Real GDP Growth (%), 1991-2003
Source: EBRD
FIGURE 3
GDP levels in 2002 (1989=100)
Source: EBRD
80 AEJ: JUNE 2004, VOL. 32, NO. 2
As a result of a sustained growth in Central and Eastern Europe and the Baltic States,
GDP in this region now exceeds its 1989 level as displayed in Figure 3. In the other regions,
GDP is still considerably lower than it was in 1989. Two observations follow. First, given
the notorious allocative ineﬃciency of the centrally planned economies, a fall of real GDP is
not the same as a decline in well-being. A decrease in the production of weapons and barbed
wire, for example, does not necessarily reduce the welfare of individuals. Second, the regions
are far from homogeneous and the variation is large. GDP levels in Central and Eastern
Europe and the Baltic States, for example, range from 77 in Latvia and Lithuania to 130
in Poland. In South-Eastern Europe GDP levels range from 50 in Serbia and Montenegro
to 121 in Albania. In the Newly Independent States, they range from 38 in Georgia to 106
in Uzbekistan. However, it is questionable to what extent the data are reliable [The World
Bank, 2002, p. 8].
Central and Eastern European countries have managed the transition better than coun-
tries in South-Eastern Europe and certainly better than the Newly Independent States. Im-
provements have largely been accomplished by market-oriented policy reforms and the cre-
ation of a better social safety netthough still inadequate to the European standardwhile
at the same time moving toward a more broad-based tax system. Initially, inßation reached
very high levels. As Figure 4a shows, in particular, hyperinßation occurred in South-Eastern
Europe and the Newly Independent States comparable to the inßation in Germany prior to
World War II. However, in Central and Eastern Europe and the Baltic States, inßation rolled
back to controllable levels by the mid 1990s while South-Eastern Europe followed suit. It
took the Newly Independent States longer to get inßation under control. However, Figure
4b shows that by the late 1990s they managed to do it. Recently, they seem to have reached
single digit inßation levels. Again, individual countries vary widely. Inßation rates in Central
and Eastern Europe and the Baltic States in 2003 ranged from -0.8 percent in Lithuania to
8.5 percent in Slovakia. In South-Eastern Europe, they ranged from 1.5 percent in Macedonia
to 14.5 percent in Romania. Finally, in the Newly Independent States, they ranged from 2.1








Providing public goods and services and a social safety net while maintaining macroeco-
nomic stability requires the ability to raise revenues eﬃciently and equitably. Figure 5 shows
that budget deÞcits were very high in the Newly Independent States immediately after the
collapse of the Soviet Union. They were high in South-Eastern Europe and modestat least
to the current American standardin Central and Eastern Europe and the Baltic States.
However, from the mid 1990s, the deÞcits have been reduced. In the late 1990s, budget
discipline relaxed a little bit in Central and Eastern Europe (not in the Baltic States, though
the graph does not make this distinction). Surprisingly, the budgetary performance seems
in reverse order: the Newly Independent States are doing the best and Central and Eastern
Europe are doing the worst. DeÞcits in Central and Eastern Europe now exceed the 3 percent
cap set by the Economic and Monetary Unions Stability and Growth Pact. The variation
among individual countries is also wide in this respect. General government balances in Cen-
tral and Eastern Europe and the Baltic States in 2003 ranged from 0.5 percent of GDP in
Estonia to -8.3 percent in the Czech Republic. In South-Eastern Europe, they ranged from
-0.7 percent in Bulgaria to -5.8 percent in Albania. Finally, in the Newly Independent States,
they varied from 2 percent in Russia to -4.8 percent in the Kyrgyz Republic.
Also, there has been a privatization process which has been pushed very hard by interna-
tional organizations including the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. Figure
6 shows the results of the privatization process for four individual countries each represent-
ing a region. Estonia represents the Baltic States; Hungary represents Central and Eastern
Europe; Romania represents South-Eastern Europe; and Ukraine represents the Newly In-
dependent States. Central and Eastern Europe and the Baltic States made considerable
progress with privatization while South-Eastern Europe and the Newly Independent States
lag behind. However, the reliability of this kind of data seems questionable. In Russia, for
example, privatization has been relatively successful in terms of private sector share in GDP
(70 percent in 2002). However, this is actually the result of what could also be called the
biggest robbery of the state in the twentieth century. Under president Yeltsin, a few oligarchs
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grabbed the assets of very large state-owned companies in exchange for political support.1
Moreover, under communist rule, there was hardly any private ownership, though it did exist
according to the EBRD data. However, many economists in Romania do not consider the
data for their country to be credible, neither for the Þrst year after the upheavals nor for
later years.
FIGURE 5
General Government Balances (in % of GDP), 1991-2003
Source: EBRD
FIGURE 6
Private Sector Share in GDP
Source: EBRD
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Taxation in Central and Eastern European Countries
While most countries in the region struggle to deal with continued budget deÞcits, the
question arises as to how much revenue a country can expect to raise. At what point should
the emphasis be placed on reducing expenditure rather than raising revenue? Answering this
question involves evaluating a countrys tax capacity and tax eﬀort. Tax capacity is deÞned
as the ability of a government to raise tax revenue based on structural factors such as the
level of economic development and the number of tax handles available, and the ability of
the population to pay taxes [Chelliah, 1971, p. 293]. Tax eﬀort is deÞned as a measure of
how well a country is using its taxable capacity, that is, tax eﬀort is the ratio of actual tax
collections to taxable capacity [Bahl, 1971, p. 582]. Indices of tax eﬀort provide a tool for
measuring diﬀerences between countries in how eﬀectively they are using their potential tax
bases. These indices may indicate the appropriate policy for dealing with a Þscal imbalance.
For example, countries with a high tax eﬀort index may need to look at reducing expenditures
rather than raising taxes [Stotsky, 1997].
Figure 7 shows average total taxation as a percentage of GDP over the period 1996-2002
in diﬀerent regions and includes Germany and the U.S.A. as benchmarks. It is expected that
the Newly Independent States have the greatest taxation problems. They have been under
communist rule for over 70 years. The state Þnanced itself through state-owned companies
rather than taxation, so the Newly Independent States have very little experience with tax-
ation and markets. Nonetheless, they are approaching the (relatively low) level of taxation
in the U.S.A. and the lower limit of the range in European Union countries, which is roughly
30-55 percent of GDP [van der Hoek, 2003b, p. 22]. Tax levels in Central and Eastern Europe
and the Baltic States and South-Eastern Europe are on average within the range of European
Union countries.
FIGURE 7
General Government Revenue (in % of GDP), 1996-2002
Source: EBRD
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After more then a decade of transition and in view of the European Unions eastern
enlargement of 2004, it seems relevant to know how well the accession countries are utiliz-
ing their tax capacity. Musgrave [2000] identiÞes several factors that determine a countrys
taxable capacity: the stage of development, often measured by per capita income; the ex-
istence and extent of tax handles; and eﬃcacy of tax administration. Each of these factors
contribute either to a countrys potential taxable base (for example, the greater the level of
economic development the higher the income tax base) or to the accessibility to that tax base
by the government. For example, an economy characterized by an established manufacturing
sector has more easily identiÞable and accessible taxpayers than an economy that is largely
agrarian or comprised of small traders. A strong manufacturing sector signiÞes the existence
of a tax handle. A simple measure of tax eﬀort across countries might compare countries
share of tax revenue to GDP. However, such comparisons ignore diﬀerences in tax capacity
across countries. Countries diﬀer with respect to their economic situations, for example, per
capita income, structure, resources, and other factors. These diﬀerences must be accounted
for when measuring tax eﬀort.
Another approach is to use regression analysis across countries to predict a countrys tax
to GDP share [Bahl, 1971; Chelliah, 1971; Stotsky and WoldeMariam, 1997; Tait, Gratz,
and Eichengreen, 1979; and Tanzi, 1968, 1992]. A tax eﬀort index can be developed as the
ratio of actual tax share to the predicted tax share. An index of one means the countrys tax
eﬀort is at the expected level, given the structural factors of that country. In other words,
the country is using its taxable capacity at a level consistent with the average of the other
countries in the sample. By comparing tax eﬀort across similar countries, it may be possible
to identify countries which have the potential to increase tax revenues through increased tax
eﬀort. Alternatively, countries may be identiÞed where tax eﬀort is already relatively high
and it would be more obvious to closely examine the expenditure side of the budget.
A recent study [Mertens, 2003] uses a regression approach covering the period 1992-
2000 and includes data for ten countries in Central and Eastern and South-Eastern Europe:
Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Macedonia, Poland, Romania, the
Slovak Republic, and Slovenia. Notably, this sample does not include all European Union
accession countries. Rather, it comprises seven accession countries and three countries in
the West Balkans that are already or will become applicant countries. A very interesting
dimension of this study is that it presents a ranking based on each countrys deviation between
its actual and predicted tax to GDP ratio. The results are summarized in Table 3. The value
of 14.9 percent for Romania in 2000 means that the countrys actual revenue share was 14.9
percent lower than that predicted by the model.
TABLE 3
Deviation of Actual Tax Share from Predicted, as a Percentage of Predicted
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Albania -4.7 17.2 15.4 14.8 -12.2 -10.6 3.3 0.4 12.0
Bulgaria -3.5 -19.1 -8.9 -15.8 - -6.9 -1.4 -10.1 -13.4
Croatia - - 21.0 22.8 21.6 17.7 25.7 10.6 7.9
Czech Republic - 11.0 8.6 7.7 5.4 -2.0 -4.4 -2.0 -
Hungary 4.4 9.1 2.3 10.4 5.6 1.9 1.0 - -
Macedonia - - - - -4.1 -7.0 -10.6 -8.7 -
Poland -3.1 3.6 -2.3 -4.2 -6.1 -8.3 -11.6 -14.7 -16.6
Romania 8.8 5.1 -5.9 -3.5 -9.8 -14.6 -15.7 -10.1 -14.9
Slovakia - - -5.3 3.7 2.1 -5.9 -9.2 -14.3 -
Slovenia - 11.6 9.7 8.0 5.5 3.7 4.0 6.2 1.7
Source: Mertens (2003), p. 548.
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The results of the Mertens study indicates that greater eﬀorts are possible in several
Central and Eastern and South-Eastern European countriesespecially Bulgaria, Poland,
Romania, and Slovakia - to improve tax revenues via increasing tax eﬀort. This kind of in-
formation may be used by the European Commission, in particular with regard to Poland and
Slovakia, now that these countries have joined the European Union. The accession countries
will have to accept the principles of Economic and Monetary Union. Since they cannot opt
out, they will have to meet the well-known Maastricht-criteria on inßation, real interest rates,
budget deÞcits, public debt, and exchange rate stability. The European Commission may use
the data pertaining to tax eﬀort, in particular, in relation to the Stability and Growth Pacts
budget deÞcit criterion.
Future research
The study cited above [Mertens, 2003] points out some possible avenues for further re-
search. Countries in Central and Eastern Europe and South-Eastern Europe have had myriad
tax law changes as well as major tax reform eﬀorts over the 1990s. Reviewing these events
may shed light on what is happening with tax eﬀort in Central and Eastern Europe and
South-Eastern Europe. For example, Slovenia and Croatia consistently have tax eﬀort in-
dices above one, and both have positive deviations from predicted tax shares for each year.
These two countries share many common factors including a steady approach to tax reform.
Slovenia introduced income tax laws in 1994, a tax administration law in 1997, and the VAT
in 1999. Croatia began creating its tax service in 1993, introduced income taxes in 1994, and
the VAT in 1998. Like Croatia and Slovenia, Poland and Hungary have had more systematic
tax reform eﬀorts in the sense that they have made few major revisions of tax laws already en-
acted. One major diﬀerence is the timing of tax administration legislation: Hungary has yet
to enact a major reform of its tax administration; and Poland undertook tax administration
reform in 1997, Þve years after income tax reform and four years after the introduction of the
VAT. Since tax administration is an important component in tax eﬀort, further examination
of these relationships is warranted.
Another factor that warrants further examination is corruption. Although it is a phe-
nomenon that is not easy to study, data are available about perceived corruption levels in
a large and growing number of countries. Transparency International publishes an annual
Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) for a growing number of countries. Table 4 shows the
amount of perceived corruption over time in selected countries. The scores range between 10
(highly clean) and 0 (highly corrupt) and relate to perceptions of the degree of corruption
as seen by business people and risk analysts. Respondents expressed their perceptions in
surveys assessing a countrys performance. At least three surveys are required for a country
to be included. Therefore, in its most recent index, Transparency International could include
only 133 of the more than 200 sovereign nations.
It seems plausible that negative relationships exist between corruption and economic
development and between corruption and tax eﬀort. The low scores for countries in Central
and Eastern Europe and South-Eastern Europe indicate that doing business in these countries
is subject to normal business risks and to additional risks resulting from corruption. As a
result, businesses face additional uncertainties. Particularly worrying is that the amount of
perceived corruption generally does not diminish over time. Rather, it remains stable or even
grows. Politicians increasingly pay lip-service to the Þght against corruption but fail to clamp
down on corruption to break the vicious circle of poverty and graft. Corruption seems a self-
sustaining phenomenon since anti-corruption measures tend to be adopted where they are
needed least: in countries which do not have particularly serious corruption problems [Steves
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and Rousso, 2003, p. 28]. Transition countries with low levels of administrative corruption
have been more likely to adopt intensive anti-corruption programs than countries with high
levels of administrative corruption.
TABLE 4
Corruption Perceptions Index, 1995-2003
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
1. Finland 9.1 9.1 9.5 9.6 9.8 10.0 9.9 9.7 9.7
7. Netherlands 8.7 8.7 9.0 9.0 9.0 8.9 8.8 9.0 8.9
18. USA 7.8 7.7 7.6 7.5 7.5 7.8 7.6 7.7 7.5
29. Slovenia - - - - 6.0 5.5 5.2 6.0 5.9
35. Italy 3.4 3.4 5.0 4.6 4.7 4.6 5.5 5.2 5.3
40. Hungary 4.1 4.9 5.2 5.0 5.2 5.2 5.3 4.9 4.8
50. Greece 4.0 5.0 5.4 4.9 4.9 4.9 4.2 4.2 4.3
54. Bulgaria - - - 2.9 3.3 3.5 3.9 4.0 3.9
54. Czech Republic - 5.4 5.2 4.8 4.6 4.3 3.9 3.7 3.9
59. Croatia - - - - 2.7 3.7 3.9 3.8 3.7
Slovak Rep. - - - 3.9 3.7 3.5 3.7 3.7 3.7
64. Poland - 5.6 5.1 4.6 4.2 4.1 4.1 4.0 3.6
83. Romania - - 3.4 3.0 3.3 2.9 2.8 2.6 2.8
86. Russia - 2.6 2.3 2.4 2.4 2.1 2.3 2.7 2.7
92. Albania - - - - 2.3 - - 2.5 2.5
106. Macedonia - - - - 3.3 - - - 2.3
133. Bangladesh - - - - - - - 1.2 1.3
Source: Transperancy International.
There is some evidence supporting the hypothesis of a negative relationship between cor-
ruption and tax eﬀort. Admittedly, a quick view of the data suggests there is no relationship
between tax eﬀort and corruption at all (see Figure 8a). However, that is actually caused by
three pairs of observations (pertaining to Albania, Bulgaria, and Croatia).
FIGURE 8a
Tax Eﬀort and Corruption
Notes: CPI data rescaled to one-sixth of their original values. Sources: Transparency International
and Mertens [2003].
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Figure 8b ignores these three countries and concentrates on the next seven pairs of obser-
vations. It becomes clear that these observations do suggest a correlation between corruption
and tax eﬀort. This is certainly an avenue for future research. However, a serious problem is
the lack of data since time series are very short. Sometimes, data are available for just one
year and not in a time series. In addition, data on tax eﬀort are scarce. Obviously, this is a
challenge for students of taxation in transition countries.
FIGURE 8b
Tax Eﬀort and Corruption
Notes: CPI data rescaled to one-sixth of their original values. Sources: Transparency International
and Mertens [2003].
Footnotes
1Interestingly, a partial and seemingly erratic cancelation seems to unravel under Yeltsins suc-
cessor Putin. The owners of the Russian holding company Menatep, controlling Russias biggest
oil company Yukos, have oﬀered their share in Yukosan estimated 44 percentto the Russian
government in exchange for the release of Michail Chodorkovski, the former CEO and president of
Yukos. Chodorkovski was arrested on October 25, 2003 on charges of fraud and tax evasion (NRC
Handelsblad, February 16, 2003).
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